Identity and International Relations
Democratic Statecraft Taken to It’s Extreme
In examining whether democracies should coerce autocracies to accept democratic reforms, this essay will only touch upon if democracies can achieve such a feat and instead focus on how such an end could be achieved. The aim is to consider the costs and risks of achieving an international system with less autocratic practices, if not without autocracies altogether. These costs and risks occupy both material and ethical concerns. First, this essay will examine how democracies can use military, economic, and diplomatic statecraft to force autocracies to reform, along with likely autocratic countermeasures. Second, this essay will examine democratic cooperation and competition in a post-autocratic international system. Third, these comparisons will be collectively analyzed to determine if democracies make the world more secure.
In analyzing military statecraft, Schelling, Hart, and Lauren can guide the analysis. When given the option to pursue ends through statecraft or war, states will choose to statecraft in the interest of minimizing costs. These costs, however, are not simply the budgetary impacts of manpower, manufacturing, and mobilization, but the additional strategic cost of dislocation. In other words, when a state engages in warfare, it incurs the costs of resources expended as well as the cost of limited movement and reduced will to fight in other areas. Furthermore, limited movement and reduced will allows for greater exploitation, increasing the risk of warfare along a new frontline; the best time to attack an enemy is when they are already engaged in hostilities. With these considerations in mind, a strategy of democratic reform through military statecraft would seek to encourage autocracies to engage in conflicts (ideally between themselves). However, these considerations fall short of qualifying as statecraft, as they leave war as an inevitability.
Coercive diplomacy expands beyond the confines of dislocation, as it allows for a state to achieve ends with military strength but without engaging in conflict; the threat of conflict is sufficient. To be clear, if a state is engaged in conflict, they are more easily exploitable through coercive democracy given that their means of defense are more limited. By extension, this would give democracies an incentive to encourage autocracies to engage in combat, as that allows for a more effective use of the threat of force. However, coercive diplomacy does not require that an enemy state be actively engaged in war prior to its application, and if democracies aim to pursue just ends (peace and security), they should also use just means to force democratic reform.
Deterrence and compellence are the strategies that coercive diplomacy manifests, where the strategies take defensive and offensive postures respectively. In the theoretical scenario presented here, where democratic states are pursuing an aggressive policy, compellence would be the only strategy available to democratic states. Compellence requires that states demonstrate capability and resolve to their enemies, and few would question the capability of the democratic alliance. The United States, Europe, and the rest of the democratic powers have the arms and the capacity to manufacture arms in large quantities. The will to fight is much more problematic for democracies. A cursory overview of the international system shows that the United States is involved in Yemen and Syria. Furthermore, Europe and the United States are providing arms and funding to Ukraine. The more powerful democracies are to some degree dislocated, and as such are unable to communicate maximum resolve. Additionally, citizens are unlikely to support a war against the autocracies of the world simply for the greater good of democracy. Popular resistance by American citizens against American aid disbursements to Ukraine’s fight for continued independence demonstrates as much. While it is not actual warfare, but the threat of war that is the effective use of statecraft, the public understands the risks inherent in such threats.
Autocracies, in contrast, would be operating defensively, and as such would have the option to utilize compellence or deterrence. Autocracies do not experience the same limitations as democracies. The worry that the subjects of an autocracy might be opposed to war, and by extension may vote the autocrat out of office, does not exist. This grants autocracies an advantage in their ability to communicate resolve, a necessary component of deterrence and compellence. Furthermore, autocracies have the capacity for deterrence in the form of both conventional and nuclear weapons. It can be assumed that autocracies, like any state, would consider a threat against their existence sufficient reason to use all necessary means to resist regime change. In the case of compellence, autocracies have little capacity. Compellence requires power projection, and while autocratic states have the capacity to build the means necessary to project power, they find themselves at a disadvantage relative to the United States and its existing navy. An important distinction to make here is that while autocracies have an advantage in communicating resolve as a direct result of existing as autocracies, the disadvantage in capability is incidental, and not explicitly a result of their status as autocracies. (Some may argue that if the United States were an autocracy, it would not be able to project power as effectively, but that conversation is ultimately an alternate history exercise that is beyond the scope of this paper). In any case, as democracies and autocracies stand now, both fail to meet the requirements necessary for successful compellence, but for different reasons. In the case of autocratic deterrence against democracies, the strategy works precisely because autocracies doubt the resolve within democracies necessary for compellence.
In examining economic statecraft, Hirschman, Baldwin, and Mastanduno direct the analysis. The same material requirements discussed in terms of capability for military statecraft apply in economic statecraft, but the wielding of resources is different. To be clear, there is some overlap as state spending in manpower, manufacturing, and mobilization stimulates job growth and indirect economic benefits in related industries, but economic statecraft extends beyond military spending. The democratic bloc has some advantages in capability given its production of inelastic high-end goods ranging from advanced microchips to popular luxury brands. In contrast, autocracies like China and Vietnam produce mainly elastic products like mass-produced consumer goods and cheap clothing, while autocracies like Russia produce raw materials like oil and gas, which are necessary inputs for manufacturing. That is not to say that one bloc or the other has a clear advantage in economic statecraft purely based on the nature of their exports, but it does demonstrate that both blocs have the capability for effective economic statecraft. Nor does it mean that these exports define every member of the blocs. For example, Norway operates a sovereign wealth fund that purchases investments using its petroleum revenue — something more descriptive of a middle east oil monarchy than a European democracy.
Economic statecraft requires the consideration of both the economic capability of a state, and the nature of the economic relationship between states. The relevance of the relationship is that it directs economic strategy in the direction of carrots or sticks. The simplest relationship to analyze is the relationship that does not exist. If states do not have an economic relationship, there is nothing with which to threaten each other. However, there is the possibility of beginning an economic relationship, and this relationship can be granted, on the part of the democracies, such that the targeted autocracy accepts some democratic reforms. Existing relationships are more complex in that both carrots and sticks are valid forms of economic statecraft. Democracies with existing relationships with autocracies can offer to provide more economic inducements in exchange for promised democratic reforms. Alternatively, democracies may threaten to reduce or discontinue an economic relationship unless the target state complies with demands. In this sense, economic statecraft takes on a compellent nature, where target states are directed to change their behavior. However, in the case of carrots the target is threatened with continuing as they are, where with sticks the target is threatened with devolving to a lower economic position. In both cases, one should remember that the ultimate target is the autocracy’s civilian population, the poorest of which are likely to starve and/or go unhoused in the absence of improved economic conditions. This may be arguably better than the nuclear annihilation or conventional warfare that would result from poorly executed military statecraft, but there are victims, nonetheless.
Thus far it has been shown that democracies have the capability for economic statecraft, but history suggests that they have only limited resolve required to operate effectively. In the case of existing economic relationships between democracies and autocracies, the type of relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia described by Perkins indicates a relationship that the United States is not willing to end. Even with record levels of oil production from American shale fields, Saudi oil exports remain key to the economies of Europe and other American allies. To the degree to which the United States values globalization, which is presumably fundamental to the theorized democratic alliance in this scenario, the relationship with Saudi Arabia remains non-negotiable. Furthermore, the severing of other international relationships further entrenches the need for maintain the Saudi relationship. Be it the recent Russian sanctions, or the ongoing sanctions against Venezuela, the democratic powers cannot afford to sever ties with yet another oil-producing state. However, this is an extreme example of the limitations of sanctions and does not disprove the ability of democracies to use sanctions. The same globalized system that produced a dependency between American allies and an autocracy has allowed for democracies to successfully apply sequentially more restrictive and complete sanctions on Russia following their invasion of Ukraine. However, it should be noted that Russia shifted its exports to other autocracies like China, or to historically non-aligned states like India, to absorb some of the economic shocks induced by sanctions. In short, democracies have the resolve to impose sanctions, but only to a limited degree and effect.
In the case of economic carrots, the democratic powers face several challenges. First, in the case of lifting existing sanctions, Drezner shows that the United States has a history of refusing to lift sanctions once imposed, while suggesting that sanctions can only be lifted after full democratization. This history communicates to autocracies that negotiations over economic relationships are more likely than not a waste of time. Second, in the case of military assistance, Karlin shows that the United States continually fails to use its influence to reform target states, which allows for recipient states to strengthen their militaries without adopting reforms. This communicates to the democratic bloc that they would be better off without offering military aid to autocratic rivals. Third, Baldwin shows that success through foreign aid in general occurs at relatively low rates, indicating that democracies are likely to make bad investments through foreign aid in about two-thirds of all cases. Fourth, engaging in a trade relationship creates dependencies that an autocracy can leverage to gain concessions. Simply put, democracies and autocracies have divergent reasons to converge upon reasons not to use economic carrots.
As to the question of diplomatic statecraft, Berridge, Lauren, and Ross have much to offer to the subject in general, but for the hypothetical scenario at hand, the primary consideration is that of resistance points. If the democratic powers aim to force autocratic states to adopt democracy, and if autocratic regimes aim to hold onto power, then the resistance points of the two blocks have no overlap — a settlement range does not exist. However, in the interest of examining if and how government type changes the logic of economic statecraft, some modifications can be made to the hypothetical scenario presented.
If the democratic bloc has privately made peace with the fact that not all nations can be coerced into full democracy status, they may instead opt to negotiate in favor of the adoption of limited democratic reforms. In choosing who to send as lead negotiator, both parties would have to consider the reputation of the individual sent as well as the country they originate from. Going by Ross’ guidelines, the best negotiators and states to supply them would be those that have never lied or bluffed, or at a minimum those that have never been caught doing so. This requirement disqualifies negotiators from the great powers: Russia has abandoned multiple treaties, the United States has done the same in addition to lying about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and China has violated the democratic freedoms it had promised to allow Hong Kong. Representatives from states like Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates would be better suited at representing democracies and autocracies respectively. In this sense, diplomatic statecraft does not vary depending on government type. However, autocratic governments do not have to worry about domestic concerns as much as democracies. Similar to military statecraft, autocracies are able achieve agreements swiftly, as there is one less party to consider. Democracies take more time for deliberation but are more likely to abide by their agreements. This sort of democracy-autocracy negotiation contains the worst of both worlds: a slow pace for reaching agreement and a high likelihood of failure. Furthermore, enforcement requires that states utilize military and economic statecraft for multiple forms of deterrence, meaning that the risks of these other forms of statecraft persist.
An alternative to global bilateralism is the adoption of limited democratic norms, globally, via multilateral agreements through something like the CSCE. The details of such a conference are beyond the scope of this paper, but one could imagine that if democracies were to demand democratic reforms like the recognition of women’s rights, or an independent judiciary, or term limits for the executive, then autocracies may demand cash payments to fight climate change, the lifting of economic sanctions, and the recognition of their sovereignty through the establishment of something like the Congress of Vienna. Assuming that the United States and China maintain their positions as great powers, and by extension as the head representative of their bloc, the latter demand would generate something like the Cold War bipolar international system. If Waltz’s claim that bipolar systems are the most stable is correct, then this may be the most desirable and realistic route.
If the democratic bloc manages to reform all autocratic nations into democracies, one may wonder if such an international system is desirable. The system is a prima facie good for the citizens of the world insofar as their rights are concerned, but the peace and security of the international system is less obviously secure; it is not that a world of democracies inspires a fear of conflict, but that the mere existence of such a system does not address how it is safe. Democratic peace theory may inspire a sense of security, but resources are still scarce. Furthermore, the standards for what it means to be a democracy are contested, with some suggesting that true democracies should protect individual, civil, and social rights. In other words, the elimination of autocracy as we know it today does not eliminate the need for material well-being or the ideological contention around what good government looks like. Liberal institutionalism, as described by Ikenberry, is a historically proven method for maintaining order through restraint, as embodied by membership in international institutions. Furthermore, despite the long negotiation process traditionally undertaken by democracies, their adoption of the norms set by a new international organization would be more likely permanent. Additionally, there would be less fear that cheaters would emerge, as this is more common among autocracies. For these reasons it can be determined that a world of democratic states would be safe.
Statecraft, in all its forms, falls short of empowering democracies to achieve autocratic capitulation. Granted, warfare was not examined in this paper, but a major assumption of successful statecraft is that it should not allow for the state wielding statecraft to be dislocated and exploited, and by extension should not include said state engaging in war. In the case of military statecraft, it was determined that democracies have the capability, but not resolve, to successfully wield it, while autocracies have the resolve, but not the capability, to do the same. Furthermore, these methods instill the fear of war and annihilation in domestic populations. In the case of economic statecraft, it was determined that both systems of government have the capability, but only limited resolve, for successful implementation. Additionally, these methods aim to deprive the most disadvantaged of their most basic needs. In the case of diplomatic statecraft, it was determined that both systems have no incentive to engage with each other in the hypothetical scenario of full capitulation. However, democracies and autocracies do have much to gain from diplomacy. Democracies can lobby for moral gains while conceding to greater sovereignty for autocratic states, which is likely to produce a more stable system. With these considerations in mind, one can determine that democratic states should pursue greater democracy as an end only insofar as diplomacy is a viable option. Through the negotiation process democracies can make the world more secure, however, they must be content with partial gains and forget ambitions for global democracy
Statecraft Applied to the Inter-Trump Era
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States entered a paradoxically insecure period. For the first time in history, a singular state existed as the hegemon of the world, but without a clear adversary, the United States did not and does not have clear direction for the use of its power. While many threats exist, none approach the existential threat embodied by the Soviet Union. This essay aims to create a new grand strategy that combats asymmetric threats. This strategy will be developed by examining how states use military, economic, and diplomatic statecraft against one another, and how these forms of statecraft can be refashioned to combat asymmetric threats.
Foundational to the premise of this essay is the idea that the United States must engage with asymmetric threats. Some may challenge this premise and claim that the United States is a superpower, with a professional army, that is designed to challenge and deter other states of equal status, and as such should not engage with weak states or non-state actors. These claims, however, are normative claims that simply fail to account for the world as it exists. Goldman expands on the need for a grand strategy absent a clear adversary, noting that abandoning grand strategy and adopting an insular attitude only heightens the perception of security — the implication being that security is not increased and instead allows for seams to appear in contested zones.
Military threats, and in turn military statecraft, is best encapsulated by terrorist activity. The uncertainty of terrorist activity escapes traditional notions of military statecraft. Schelling emphasizes the need to dislocate and exploit the enemy while avoiding the same, but there are gray areas in terms of who is a terrorist, where are the terrorists, and where and who do they aim to attack next. If terrorists are successful in an attack, then the possibility to deter and compel future terrorists of the same group presents itself, but this method of reactive actions does not qualify as good statecraft. The fact that a terrorist was able to successfully execute an attack is evidence of poor statecraft, and a decision to pursue terrorists after an attack is poor statecraft as it ties up resources. To commit to a pursuit in a reactive manner is to dislocate oneself. However, refusing to react to an attack can harm an elected official’s likelihood of reelection, in addition to inadvertently encouraging future terrorists with the possibility of success without reprisal. To be clear, retaliation in general does fall within the purview of statecraft; Axelrod promotes the tit-for-tat strategy as a method for creating order in the international system. The complication is that even when a terrorist group is identified as responsible for an attack, their members are unknown, and their geographic reach is vague at best, leaving even less strict interpretations of statecraft (those that allow for war) without a clear direction. One may instead aim to proactively dislocate and exploit terrorists, but the same uncertainty that hinders a pursuit hinders proactive behavior. The target of deterrent and compellent strategies is unclear before an attack.
In the domain of economic threats and statecraft, criminal enterprise best represents the asymmetric threat. Economic threats operate with the same ambiguous nature as military threats, but their motives are for profit and not for violence. Naturally, criminal activity, even if purely motivated by profit, can be violent, and as such there is a relationship between criminal economic transactions and security. The problem that arises is that there are no carrots and sticks, no invitations to an economic relationship or existing economic relationship to sever. Furthermore, criminal activity operates beyond the caricature of gang violence in urban America; criminal enterprises are often envisioned as drug and sex-trafficking operations that hinder the stability and local economy of a state that operates with many illicit activities within its territories. While this may be the case in some instances, Felbab-Brown indicates that this perception can be contrary to reality; illicit activity can provide stability and economic activity for locals. In some cases, the state may not be merely harboring criminal organizations (incidentally or otherwise), but may be the criminal organization itself, best exemplified by Chestnut’s analysis of North Korea. In other cases (as Kiourktsoglou and Courtois explored), actors who are more traditionally associated with military concerns (ISIS) engage in illicit trade to fund their operations. These realities only increase the aforementioned entanglement of military and economic statecraft among asymmetric foes.
Secessionist and insurrectionist groups come to mind when discussing diplomatic statecraft within the context of asymmetric strategy. At a minimum there is some understanding as to what territory a group claims. This may appear to offer an avenue for success, as an enemy with political goals should be the easiest for a political entity like a state to engage with. However, the mere offer to speak with the leaders of secessionist and insurrectionist groups legitimizes their claims. Whether these groups are present within allied or antagonist states, the tacit recognition of such groups is bound to cause diplomatic pain for the United States. If the United States operates with the consent of the target state, and the negotiation process manages to survive the various challenges described by Byman, Walter notes that the chance for an extremist within the target group to sabotage negotiations remains. Situations like these have the analysis loop back to military statecraft, and the same difficulties remain: these groups often have members who live and work among civilians, and as such are difficult to identify.
The solution to asymmetric actors lies in the thread that runs through all the failed forms of traditional statecraft — military statecraft. Traditional military statecraft utilizes both deterrence and compellence, which both in turn rely on capability and resolve. Resolve in this context most obviously falters in the existence of contested zones in the seams of the international system. Within these seams, non-state and weak state actors are able to operate unchallenged by the United States. These actors benefit largely from Sandler’s collective action problem, where states are unwilling to pool their resources to prevent terrorist attacks. It is simply easier and more cost-effective to deflect potential terrorist activity to weaker state, compared to proactive efforts. Putting aside the eroding resolve for foreign campaigns experienced in the last two decades, one could argue that the United States should simply unilaterally engage with terrorists at the seams, thereby providing a good for itself and the global community. However, actions like these undertaken by a superpower, let alone the hegemon, can create fear in the international system, which can in turn provide justification for a renewed security dilemma and arms race against antagonistic states. In short, aggressive pursuit of military ends with sufficient capability and resolve can, in the long term, as Posen theorized, limit capability.
The best option for military statecraft is some version of what Ikenberry and Posen have suggested: an alliance of states that are committed to combatting terrorism. From the point of view of potential terrorists, an institution like this would communicate both a minimization of the collective action, and a form of deterrence. The idea has historical precedence in the form of the United States’ invocation of NATO’s Article 5 in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Granted, NATO is an institution originally designed for combatting threats not just from states, but from states like the Soviet Union which held the title of superpower, but this deviation from the original intent only further proves the viability of an organization dedicated to combating terror. Furthermore, from the point of view of states outside of the institutional structure, the institution appears to act as a restraint for the United State, which would otherwise be viewed as operating with indiscretion vis-à-vis the international system as a whole. For states that exist within the institutional structure, they would have a say in how the United States wields its military power and its control of the commons. The latter consideration is likely to fuel petitions for membership by competing powers.
The introduction of competing powers like China into a new institutional structure offers many benefits despite the added restraints. In the case of criminal economic activity, funds are required to build and sustain economies that can replace criminal activity. These new economies are necessary not just to provide a moral good to the civilians affected, but to reduce the likelihood that an area return to criminal activity, as well as to reduce future terrorist activity that sprouts as revenge against foreign states. To the degree that China and other powers have an interest in moving towards a multipolar system by proving their reputation via commitment to international norms, one should expect these powers to aid in the funding of projects that aim to minimize criminal economic activity. To the degree that China and other states honestly pursue a ban on nuclear proliferation, one should expect these states to aid in the reduction of both criminal networks around rogue states like North Korea, as well as using their unique position to limit, if not outright dismantle, North Korea’s nuclear program. In the case of weak states like Iraq and Syria, who are victim to ISIS and its criminal activity, one would hope that states like China would aid in the establishment of institutions (ideally somewhat democratic) to strengthen weak states.
Key to this institutional structure is the use of diplomatic statecraft among states. Diplomacy between states and non-state actors find better chances of success in a world governed by an institution like the one presented here. Non-state actors would be assured early on that violence would not be rewarded but punished by collective action. This incentivizes secessionists and insurrectionists to come to the negotiating table earlier, while disincentivizing extremists within their ranks from sabotaging negotiations.
To be completely transparent, there are some drawbacks to this strategy. Current trends in the west suggest a turn towards populism, which is sure to loathe a new international institution as much as it loathes existing institutions. Furthermore, while capability now and in the future are preserved, and while resolve is strengthened, this new institution requires that it engage an enemy in the seams to gain credibility. Just as non-state actors and new states have no reputation, new institutions have no record of upholding their agreements. To this end, at a minimum, the proposed institution must dislocate itself, and risk exploitation, to earn credibility. In other words, the best grand strategy for the United States in the long term, in the absence of an enemy, is to build new institutions made for the purpose of identifying and eliminating said unknown enemies. However, in the short term, this amounts to less than ideal statecraft.
Decision Making and the Intervention in Libya
This paper aims to investigate and analyze choices that led to the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in 2011. From spring into autumn one can trace the various deals and evaluations decision-makers were forced to consider in the face of a soon to be humanitarian crisis. The major actors (primarily high-level officials in the United States government), goals, bargains, decisions, and motivations will be discussed with the aim of deciphering which, if any, of the four major decision-making models can apply to the 2011 intervention in Libya.
Key to the decision-making analysis is the context in which leaders make choices; context provides a foundation for motives, constraints, and goals. Context primarily concerns recent history, system level interstate relations, and foreign leadership perspectives and priorities. The perspectives of decision-makers will be discussed briefly in this section, with more detailed analysis in later sections if necessary.
The termination of Gaddafi’s multi-decade reign of Libya coincided with a variety of long-running historical trends in which the United States began to minimize its primacy. Twenty years prior to the events in question, the Cold War ended, leaving the United States as the sole superpower. In the decade following the Soviet collapse, the world experienced many intrastate wars and humanitarian crises at a time when the western powers reduced their defense spending. In the new millennium, operating under practically unquestioned supremacy, the United States pursued regime change and anti-terrorist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. These differ somewhat in the international reception of American use of force. In the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, “… when Washington tried to secure formal approval for war, the United States and its partners failed to gain their desired second U.N. resolution in early 2003. That is why, practically and legally, the war was not explicitly or unambiguously legal.” (O’Hanlon) In contrast, the United Nations called on member states to aid the people of Afghanistan in forming a transitional government. (Resolution 1378) The decade between the invasion of Afghanistan and the intervention in Libya saw the United States bleed soldiers, money, and the good will of the international community. Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis was seen by some as a failure of the American-led liberal international system. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao is perhaps the most impactful example of this phenomenon. (Dean) These trends applied system-level pressure for the Obama administration to secure international support against Gaddafi.
The uprising against Gaddafi was part of the larger Arab Spring, which sought to reform the autocratic regimes of the Arab world. Various factors influenced the uprisings, and in the case of Libya, indices of low press freedom and human rights suggest that these may have been the primary factors. (Robinson) Libya’s experience in the Arab spring is unique in that Gaddafi made genocidal threats against his own people:
“Gaddafi’s description of the protesters as ‘cockroaches,’ his promise to ‘cleanse Libya house by house,’ and his threat to attack Benghazi and show its residents ‘no mercy’ provided clear evidence of the regime’s intent to commit mass atrocities and supported the view of senior UN officials that the crisis should be viewed through the lens of atrocity prevention.” (Williams 278-279)
Following United Nations Security Council resolutions, requests from western powers, and pleas from various regional organizations, coalition forces intervened in the form of air support.
Other decision-making processes at the international level are relevant inasmuch as they influenced the Obama administration’s decision-making, but they will only be discussed as needed, as opposed to a in depth analysis where each decision-making model is applied to United Nations Security Council or to NATO.
Political decision-making’s four primary models are determined by two binary variables: the decision-maker’s unitary or non-unitary form, and the decision-making processes’ rational or non-rational approach. The Obama administration may be described as both unitary and rational, which may indicate that the rational actor model is the best fit. A narrow definition of success which considers only the operational endpoint is the most generous interpretation for this framework. That is to say that one can begin analysis with the fact that Operation Odyssey Dawn’s, “… air campaign saved the 700,000 people of Benghazi from extermination by Gaddafi; it obliterated Libya’s air defense system; deployed aircraft and ships to enforce UNSCR 1970 and 1973; and, gave rebels the strategic space to overthrow Gaddafi.” (Heffern 26) According to Ambassador Heffern, the choice for Obama to act and to therefore gain operational success was simplified by four factors: French and British pressure, Arab League and UNSC approval, the likely short timeframe to halt Gaddafi’s genocidal advance into Benghazi, and the creation of a military option with success. (Heffern 14) These factors also met Obama’s goals of operating in a multilateral manner without committing ground forces. (Heffern 13) As mentioned in the earlier section on context, the decade long war on terror and the financial crisis had soured the international community’s opinion of the United States, therefore a multilateral operation that did not require troop deployment was the best choice available.
The nature of the international system directed Obama to execute operation Odyssey Dawn. This is of utmost importance in the rational actor model; Simon reminds analysts that the peculiarities of the choice maker can be ignored, “… and we consider only those constraints that arise for the external situation.” (Simon 294) In support of this perspective, John McCain (Obama’s 2008 Republican opponent for the Presidency) fully supported the air campaign in Libya. (McDonnell) Consider that a presidential candidate of a different party, and a different age, and a different race, from a different part of the country, would engage in the same foreign policy actions as Obama; this is indicative of the power of system level constraints.
However, problems with this framing of the intervention arise if one examines the state of Libya following Operation Odyssey Dawn. The ad hoc coalition between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States handed command and control capability to NATO on 31 March 2011. (Heffern 21) NATO’s Operation Unified Protector continued Odyssey Dawn’s operational success, and its, “… results all were profoundly shaped by the interaction between air and indigenous land power.” (Mueller 3) That is to say that both NATO air power and rebel operations on the ground were responsible for continuing and ending the war against Gaddafi. If NATO operations, which merely continued coalition operations, are to be praised for the successful conclusion of the Gaddafi regime, then they should be blamed for the ensuing chaos:
“Libya’s new leaders faced huge challenges: holding elections; writing a constitution; setting up a judiciary; managing contentious internal debates over federalism vs. centralization, and the role of political Islam. Armed militias proliferated. Salafi extremists resurged. The country was awash with small arms and other weapons. Inexperienced leaders faced serious internal rifts with no real institutions to rely on.” (Heffern 7)
Unless one is to claim that the Obama administration aimed to destabilize Libya, it cannot be argued that the rational actor model is the appropriate decision-making paradigm. It may be argued that while the outcome was not rational, the process was, and one should be mindful of the limitations of any decision maker. This would lead one to consider bounded rationality as an applicable model. (Simon 294)
Taking Simon’s lead, analysts should consider the goals and limitations of the Obama administration. (Simon 294) Obama recognized the limitations placed on the United States by its ongoing operations in Afghanistan, as well as the low strategic value of Libya, but he believed that something should be done to protect the Libyan people. (Heffern 13) Balancing constraints and goals, Obama summarized the mission’s operational goals in a press release: “… we would not put ground troops into Libya… we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.” (Remarks) No ground troops were deployed to Libya, which was the Obama administration’s legal reasoning for operating in Libya without congressional counsel or approval. (Wilson) As mentioned earlier, the U.S. operation Odyssey Dawn delivered air power at the front end, while transferring responsibility to allies and partners with the implementation of operation Unified Protector. Within the limits of bounded rationality, it can be argued that Obama operated under the rational actor model; unfortunately, the framing required for this model as a best fit ignores the ununified nature of Obama’s advisors.
The organizational decision-making model explains decisions which are both rational and non-unitary. One may object to this characterization of the Obama administration as non-unitary on the grounds that Obama, as President, retained the power to commit government resources as well as the power to stop others in the administration from reversing his positions – Obama would appear to be the ultimate decision-maker. (Hermann 363) However, Obama believed that the United States should allow the historic change of the Arab Spring to take place, but simultaneously believed that the United States had an interest in ensuring an orderly unfolding of events in North Africa. (Heffern 11) Obama was ambivalent on the proper course of action, just as his cabinet. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are the most prominent figures from the camp against, and the camp in favor of intervention, respectively. (Heffern 11) One think-tank senior official indicates the uncertain nature of the Obama presidency in Libya: “… the White House is flying without a strategy and that we have a reactive presidency right now and not a strategic one.” (Rogin) Ultimately, Obama did not have a set strategy, and was open to influence from his cabinet and international bodies.
Obama was subject to a litany of arguments against intervention from Gates. From the burden of two ongoing wars, to the concerns about mission creep and the lack of a post-Gaddafi plan, to the risks of unintended consequences, Gates raised his concerns and those of the American public. (Heffern 11-12) Secretary of State Clinton pressured Obama to intervene on the ground that an intervention that prevents the genocide of a Muslim population is likely to improve the reputation of the United States. (Heffern 11) As mentioned earlier, the United Nations and the Arab League had asked for intervention, lending credence to the interventionist camp’s calculations.
It is tempting to declare the organizational model as the appropriate decision-making framework for the Libyan intervention, but there are key elements missing from the process: standard operating procedures and organizational culture. In the organizational model one would expect the various government bureaucracies to present Obama with a ready-made menu of choice; “The decisions of government leaders trigger organizational routines.” (Allison 164) While Clinton, Gates, and other members of either camp presented Obama with arguments for and against intervention, Obama was not presented with a standard operating procedure from which to choose. Regarding organization culture, one expects that, “Organizations will tend to emphasize, in practice, the objectives most congruent to their special capacities and to the hierarchies of beliefs in organization’s culture.” (Allsion 177) Yet these expectations were violated when the Secretary of Defense lobbied against the use of force, while the Secretary of State lobbied for armed intervention. One may object that these violations of the organizational model are minor, and that Allison’s framework rests on many conceptual pillars. Admittedly, the anomaly in organizational culture violates only one of the model’s general propositions. However, a complete lack of standard operating procedures violates basic units of analysis, the concept of actions as organizational output, how government leaders make decisions, and dominant inference patterns. (Allison 164, 169, 174, 175) One may object that examining the Odyssey Dawn from only Heffern’s perspective may incidentally omit standard operating procedures. To quell this concern, one can examine the structure and operations of United States Africa Command.
USAFRICOM was assigned as the lead command in the Libyan operation, but it was not designed for an operation like Odyssey Dawn. Its primary purpose was to support civilian operations, and while it was expected that USAFRICOM could transition and execute non-civilian operations, “staff personnel were neither familiar with nor had they practiced the processes and procedures for transitioning from security engagement operations to crisis/contingency operations.” (Quartararo 151) Yet AFRICOM did successfully engage in security operations and build a coalition even though, “AFRICOM, as lead, had no previous experience with forming a coalition…” (Quartararo 144) AFFRICOM lacked standard operating procedures and at leadership levels and lower levels. Processes as basic as communication relied on vocal commands, PowerPoints, and unencrypted emails, as opposed to methods established in other commands. (Quartararo 151-152) In short, the organizational model fails to map onto the Libyan intervention because standard operating procedures, a foundational pillar of the model, are absent at multiple levels of the decision-making structure.
Having proven that the ultimate decision maker was not unitary, the psychological model of decision-making can be discounted, given that the model requires a unitary leader. That being said, the model can be quickly and superficially analyzed to calm concerns to the contrary. One paradigm for the application of the psychological model relies on groupthink to explain decisions. As explained earlier, Obama was ambivalent on the proper course of action, and his cabinet and advisors were divided on the topic. Groupthink’s application is most appropriate when there is a dominant and cohesive in-group which demands the conformity of all members, but Obama’s cabinet operated with two insoluble camps voicing their concerns. (Janis 9) Another factor in the psychological model is mental illness or secondary effects from medication, but there are no reports of Obama suffering from either set of conditions. Furthermore, chances of such complications are much lower than average for Obama than the average President considering he was only 49 in 2011. Some other indicators of the psychological model at work include positive illusions, and reactive devaluation. (Renshonn 59-61, 72-73) Gates voiced opposition to intervention, which flies in the face of positive illusion. The fact that Obama was open to hear Gates’ concerns and chose to use limited airpower (as opposed to boots on the ground), demonstrates that Obama did not reactively devalue his Secretary of Defense. Admittedly, there are more indicators for the psychological model, but the proven non-unitary nature of the ultimate decision maker, paired with the failed indicators described in this section are sufficient to demonstrate that the psychological model is not appropriate.
By process of elimination, the bureaucratic model may be the most appropriate. However, the possibility remains that no model may sufficiently describe the 2011 intervention in Libya. Thus far the non-unitary nature of the decision-maker has been proven, but the paper began by providing evidence of rationality. For the final model one must prove non-rationality, and for Allison, decision-making in groups is inherently irrational, and only more irrational as more people are included. (Allsion 271) In practice this means that multiple actors within the decision-making body pursue their own goals, or the goals of the organization they represent (independent of the goals of the state as communicated by the executive), through a process which entails coalitions coming to a compromise. (Allsion 257) The coalitions’ leaders have already been identified as Gates and Clinton. The necessary bargains and compromises are more difficult to identify, as it seems that Obama synthesized the two coalitions’ concerns to produce a plan of action. This synthesis contained both normative and strategic components.
Some members of the interventionist camp were responding to the failure of the American government to act against the genocide in Rwanda, and the failure of the limited role in the Balkans. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice made the argument that if the United States refused to intervene, then allies, “… might act on their own and make matters worse, pulling the United States in later under even worse circumstances.” (Heffern 11) Obama’s decision to provide air support in Odyssey Dawn, while transferring command and falling back to a logistics role for NATO’s Unified Protector effectively strikes a balance between the extremes of the two coalitions in the administration. While the United States did intervene, only minimal resources were expended and only with the approval of the international community. Most of Gates’ concerns were addressed, at least partially, by this approach. While Obama did not commit overwhelming force so as to guarantee that Gaddafi did not massacre his own people, intervening with overwhelming airpower before an atrocity had begun managed to address the interventionists’ concerns.
As for the failure to consider the realities of a post-Gaddafi Libya, the governmental politics model applies as well. The failure to plan for Libya’s future can be traced back to the lack of discussion on the topic among the coalitions. The primary point of conflict was whether the United States should intervene. Questions about Libya in the long-term were not up for debate; this can be explained by the time constraints imposed by Gaddafi’s trek to exterminate his citizens. Deadlines set the priority for issues, and as such a pending atrocity took precedence over a post-war Libya. (Allison 299) Bureaucratic politics explains both the successes and failures of the intervention.
This paper has not only proven the validity of the bureaucratic politics model but has effectively disproven the appropriateness of competing models. The rational actor model is valid only under a limited interpretation of events; the organizational model fails to apply in the absence of standard operating procedures; the psychological model fails in the absence of a unitary actor, and upon analysis of psychological model indicators. While the decision-making process did lack robust and continued bargaining, Obama enacted a plan that was effectively a compromise.
Works Cited
Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed., Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999.
Dean, Jason, et al. “Chinese Premier Blames Recession on U.S. Actions.” The Wall Street Journal, 29 Jan. 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123318934318826787.
Heffern, Ambassador (ret.) John A. “The 2011 NATO Int Libya.” Case 351, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 2020. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Case Study.
Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles F. Hermann. “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 4, 1989, pp. 361–87. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600518. Accessed 5 June 2024.
Janis, Irving L. “Introduction: Why So Many Miscalculations?” Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Massachusetts, 1972, pp. 2–13.
McDonnell, Patrick J. “John McCain, in Libya, Calls for More Airstrikes and Weapons Aid for Rebels.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 23 Apr. 2011, http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2011-apr-23-la-fg-libya-mccain-20110423-story.html.
Mueller, Karl P. “CHAPTER ONE Examining the Air Campaign in Libya.” Precision and Purpose – Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2015, pp. 1–10.
O’Hanlon, Michael E. “Why the War Wasn’t Illegal.” Brookings, 28 July 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-the-war-wasnt-illegal/.
Quartararo, Joe, et al. “Libya’s Operation Odyssey Dawn: Command and Control.” PRISM, vol. 3, no. 2, 2012, pp. 141–56. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26469735. Accessed 5 June 2024. Quartararo
“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya.” The White House: President Barack Obama, 28 Mar. 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya. Accessed 4 June 2024.
Renshonn, Jonathan, and Daniel Kahneman. “Hawkish Biases and the Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict Decision-Making.” Advancing Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Relations, 1st ed., Palgrave Macmillan Cham, Cham, Switzerland, 2017, pp. 51–81, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40823-1. Accessed 5 June 2024.
Resolution 1378. 14 November 2001. S/RES/1378 (2001). United Nations. Accessed 2 June 2024. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1378.
Rogin, Josh. “How Obama Turned on a Dime toward War.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 18 Mar. 2011, foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/18/how-obama-turned-on-a-dime-toward-war/.
Simon, Herbert A. “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 79, no. 2, 1985, pp. 293–304. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1956650. Accessed 3 June 2024.
Williams, Paul D., and Alex J. Bellamy. “Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Use of Military Force.” Global Governance, vol. 18, no. 3, 2012, pp. 273–97. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23269958. Accessed 2 June 2024.
Wilson, Scott. “Obama Administration: Libya Action Does Not Require Congressional Approval – The Washington Post.” The Washington Post, 15 June 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-administration-libya-action-does-not-require-congressional-approval/2011/06/15/AGLttOWH_story.html.
THEORIES OF DECISIONMAKING
Throughout this term coursework focused on ‘ultimate decision makers,’ and how these ‘UDMs’ choose foreign policy. But this focus comes at the cost of ignoring domestic politics. The role of the legislature- the impact of public opinion – the push and pull of the media; each element is part of the historical record, and yet they play a minor role in theories of decisionmaking. How should theories of decisionmaking include domestic politics? How can scholars improve models of decisionmaking by including the domestic politics surrounding a foreign policy decision?
Foreign policy decision making at its core is a collection of models which aim to represent reality with maximum fidelity. However, models sacrifice some degree of accuracy in exchange for relative simplicity. Therefore, if one aims to increase the accuracy of decisionmaking models by incorporating domestic politics, then one must be cognizant of impacts of such a modification upon the accuracy-simplicity balance inherent to said models. For each of the four decision-making models presented in this class, this essay will explore two general avenues for model-modification: modifications that either increase complexity or maintain complexity. Modifications to models which include domestic politics without modifications to inputs or to the system of decision making are modifications that can be said to increase complexity. Modifications to models which disregard or modify inputs, or which change the system of decisionmaking with the intent to account for the inclusion of domestic politics, can be said to maintain simplicity.
For decisionmaking models in general, introducing domestic politics is coherent with foreign policy analysis: for example, Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis presents domestic politics as one of many inputs that influences the Ultimate Decision Maker (UDM). Furthermore, the same lecture suggests that domestic politics should be included in decisionmaking models for normative reasons: the inclusion of domestic politics suggests that voting (along with participation in the political process in general) matters.
The rational actor model can be best summarized as a decisionmaking process where the Ultimate Decision Maker evaluates inputs, considers likely results of a given number of choices, and acts based on probabilities. Changes which increase complexity for this model can introduce domestic politics as an input which may alter the probabilities of success for the Ultimate Decision Maker. A trivial case for the inclusion of domestic politics in the rational actor model occurs under substantive rationality. The nature of this specific form of rationality presumes that one may ignore the processing power of the Ultimate Decision Maker, where only the goals and environment of the Ultimate Decision Maker are considered relevant. (Simon 294) One should assume that a substantively rational Ultimate Decision Maker would consider domestic politics in their decisionmaking, as the first assumption of the rational actor model assumes that the Ultimate Decision Maker has complete information. (Introduction to the Rational Actor Model)
Bounded rationality, in contrast, operates with regard to the Ultimate Decision Maker’s goals, perception of the environment, and ability to process information. (Simon 294). Inlcusion of domestic politics in this variant of the rational actor model is not a given, as the UDM may not necessarily perceive domestic politics as a relevant part of the environment, or may simply lack the ability to process domestic concerns concurrently with foreign affairs. One could argue that any overt foreign policy action will draw attention from the domestic population. Members of Congress and the media are likely to praise or criticize foreign policy decisions depending on party alignment between the President and the Congressperson / pundit providing commentary. These comments often bleed into the domestic community at large, which then registers a reaction in the form of election results. In the case of a first term Presidency, a rational actor would seek reelection. For a second term Presidency, party loyalty would persuade a President to aid their party in election both for the Presidency and in Congress. Even authoritarian states have some interest in maintaining popular support, as an especially disastrous foreign policy action may result in the destruction of the regime. In other words, an Ultimate Decision Maker who rationally considers probabilistic outcome should consider domestic reactions to foreign policy actions to determine maximized utility.
Finally, while the approach described above allows for increased complexity, the model does allow for slight adjustments to account for additional information like domestic politics. Bounded rationality accounts for the limited processing of the Ultimate Decision Maker with methods of decisionmaking like “Satisficing”, which allows for the termination of decisionmaking, “… with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action.” (Simon 295) The Ultimate Decision Maker may act on a decision that allows for adequate appeal to both foreign and domestic concerns. In other words, bounded rationality allows for the inclusion of domestic politics without necessarily increasing complexity.
These arguments may lend themselves to critique in that they appear to rely on rationality as prerequisite for considerations of domestic politics. While domestic politics may be compatible with rationality, rationality is not required. The psychological model may incorporate domestic concerns via select mechanisms, and can do so by increasing the complexity of the model. Again, one must presume that the Ultimate Decision Maker has an interest in preserving power, and one must presume that the Ultimate Decision Maker processes inputs, choices, and probabilities. However, the psychological model includes the additional variable of warped perception. (Introduction to the Psychology of Decision making) For example, an Ultimate Decision Maker may be affected by prospect theory, where fear of losing domestic support in the face of an international crisis leads to an overestimation of the likelihood of a negative outcome, which leads to risk-seeking behavior on the part of the Ultimate Decision Maker, resulting in a more disastrous foreign policy outcome.
Like the rational actor model, the psychological model offers some (if limited) avenues for incorporation of domestic politics while maintaining simplicity. Domestic politics can be simplified as an input: in place of specific considerations of how a domestic population may react to a foreign policy action, one may consider that a domestic population will have some reaction. The fact that domestic politics is yet another variable for the Ultimate Decision Maker to consider is sufficient to conclude that the Ultimate Decision Maker will experience an increase in stress. Stress, as analyzed in the second lecture on decisionmaking psychology, can result in paranoia or may induce drug and alcohol use in the Ultimate Decision Maker. These altered states of mind can alter the Ultimate Decision Maker’s perception of probabilities, and can lead to foreign policy failures.
Thus far this essay has shown that decisionmaking models that presume a unitary Ultimate Decision Maker can incorporate domestic politics. Models that rely on a Non-unitary UDM, however, do not have the capacity to accommodate domestic politics. For example, the organizational decisionmaking model (ODM), as described in Introduction to the Organizational Model, requires standard operating procedures (SOPs). ODM is a effectively theory on how the menu of choice is created. SOPs are what limit the menu of choice, but domestic politics does not itself have SOPs with which to respond to events abroad. A more generous interpretation may generalize beyond literal SOPs, and instead use Allison’s “logic of appropriateness” to attempt to mesh domestic politics with the ODM. This is a viable approach, but only up to a point. It could be said that a domestic population operates with a collective memory, and as such reacts to certain events in a manner deemed appropriate based on events in history. Consider the recurring comparisons between a variety of foreign leaders and Hitler. The person that calls on this comparison does so to trigger a predictable response from the domestic population. Perhaps In certain circumstances it could be said that domestic politics operates with a logic of appropriateness, but this interpretation relies on pretending that a domestic population is comparable to an organization. Beyond a lack of SOPs, society at large lacks the clear-cut delineation between Allison’s chiefs and Indians A citizen may serve as an Indian in one domain and a chief in another. Society-wide procedures are either implemented top-down by the government (which runs contrary to the Cohen et al. Garbage Can Model of the ODM) or are implemented bottom-up through culture (which falls outside the scope of this discussion).
The bureaucratic politics model finds difficulty in this paper’s analysis for two divergent reasons. The first reason refers to similar challenges faced by the ODM. Domestic society is not structured like an organization, and as such the position of any one member in the societal hierarchy is up for debate. Bureaucratic politics requires that a senior official represent the interests of their organization and as such should lobby the Ultimate Decision Maker for foreign policy decisions that benefit their organization. However, there is no singular representative for domestic society communicating domestic concerns to the President, who then must bargain and compromise with competing senior officials. If this representative is the President, then the bureaucratic politics model is yet another model that includes domestic politics by default.
It has been shown that domestic politics can be included in unitary decisionmaking models, and it has been shown that domestic politics should be included for normative reasons, but it has yet to be shown why domestic politics should be included for practical reasons. If models of decisionmaking aim to accurately explain real world decisions, then they must include domestic politics. When Bush Sr. was faced with the chaos in Somalia, he hesitated because his chances of reelection appeared to be hampered by his focus on foreign affairs. When Carter decided to covertly extract American hostages from Iran, he decided to do so despite the high likelihood of failure because American media coverage pressured the President to act. When Nixon bombed Cambodia, he did so secretly so as to maintain his “honeymoon” with the American press. Domestic politics does impact foreign policy decision making, and as such should be included in decisionmaking models.
THE PRACTICE OF DECISIONMAKING
At its core, organizational decision-making (ODM) is such that errors are foundational to its operation. ODM is structured around the creation of a menu a choice, efficiency, and the deployment of standard operating procedures. These elements are exceptional in that they offer decision-makers relatively simple options, in a short timeframe, which allows for a quick response to any crisis abroad. However, ODM simply aims to produce choices, as each organization in the non-unitary ultimate decision-maker (UDM) produces standard operating procedures (SOPs) with a limited scope. ODM does not prioritize the production and implementation of successful foreign policy. In other words, ODM values output in general, more so than effective output.
The September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are arguably one of the greatest failures of the American government. Decisions made at the organizational level are largely responsible for the failure to process and act on information that could have stopped the 9/11 attacks. For this analysis, consider early warning signs in the chain of events and the various points of failure between and within organizations. As described in “The System Was Blinking Red, the CIA produced a report for President Bush on August 6th which suggested that Bin Laden or al Qaeda may be planning an attack on the United States. The CIA communicated a likely threat to the President, but did not themselves act, without prompting, on the new information generated. The CIA had two reasons, related to ODM, for this lack of action. First, organizations operate rationally in their own interest; for the CIA this means that they have an interest in minimizing costs, and such they will not expend time or resources if not prompted to do so (Riley’s socialization process). Second, the CIA is an agency that strictly pursues foreign interests abroad. Their organizational culture dictates that domestic threats are not important. Furthermore, the strict focus on foreign interests means that the CIA does not have SOPs for any domestic issues. The unconscious automaticity, which is key to the operation of ODM, is not present for the CIA when faced with these types of challenges.
These types of organizational failures were not unique to the CIA. National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy Advisor Hadley did not implement measures to counter Bin Laden or al Qaeda because they believed that domestic threats fell outside their purview. The strength of the organizational socialization process was strong enough to affect two senior officials to a degree that directed them to effectively ignore imminent threats.
In the case of the FBI, there were failures within the organization, as well as failures to communicate with other agencies. Like the CIA, the FBI learned that there was a looming domestic threat yet failed to act on the information. Given the FBI’s explicitly domestic jurisdiction, one may conclude that the failure of the FBI represents a failure of the organization specifically, and not the failure of ODM in general. To this view’s credit, it is true that the FBI has both an organizational culture, and a set of SOPs, which focuses on domestic issues. However, the FBI, like any other organization, retains its interest in minimizing costs. It is rational for the FBI to refuse to act on information, unless explicitly instructed to do so by decision-makers. This is a fundamental pillar of Allison’s conception of the ODM; decision-makers trigger action. This is exactly what failed to happen in the case of the FBI: the NSC, which includes advisors Rice and Hadley, only communicated that a domestic threat was present, but failed to explicitly trigger SOPs from domestic agencies.
Thus far it has been shown that the ODM can manifest failures when faced with situations that do not have a corresponding SOP, or when leadership does not trigger action within organizations. SOPs themselves can be sources of failure, even when triggered properly. The previously cited chapter in The 9/11 Commission Report makes the comparison between CIA and FBI as operating with “zone defense” and “man-to-man” coverage respectively. The report suggests that the CIA’s approach ultimately allowed Midhar to incidentally avoid surveillance by travelling to another region. The implication is that the CIA would be more effective if it were open to updating its procedures. The report’s explicit recommendation is that the CIA and FBI could have worked together to track Midhar. In either case, proposed alterations affect change by radically altering SOPs. The CIA is structured such that it surveils regions, and not individuals. As the commission report recalls, CIA analysts are forbidden from answering FBI questions on CIA information. These standard operating procedures, by virtue of their existence as standard, cannot change quickly or easily, and if they were to change, it would negatively impact CIA performance. (Allison 169) (The Inefficiencies of Organizational Decision Making)
Organizations are prone to error as a result of organizational structures, and as such ODM is itself an error prone process. The challenge here is that because organizations are inherently subject to failure, there are no solutions that can categorically solve errors across a variety of organizations. In light of this challenge, it should be recognized that ODM is too extreme in that it grants organizations full decision-making authority, while the President merely acts as a rubber stamp for one of many reflexively produced SOPs. The opposite extreme of the ODM is a system that does not rely on organizations, even to a minor degree. Ultimately this extreme is unrealistic in a sufficiently complex system; governments need factors and fractioned organizations to perform tasks within a certain range. Functionalism. As described in the introductory model to ODM, justifies the existence of organizations, despite their inherent error prone foundations and processes.
One solution to the ODM is a midpoint between full organizational decision-making authority and a system without organizations. The most literal implementation of this suggestion would be a system that simply has less organizations. There are limits to how much any leader is allowed to delete, partition, and combine organizations. Legal, budgetary, and electoral concerns would undoubtedly impact a leaders’ decisions to alter foreign policy decision-making structures. For the sake of simplicity, one can imagine a scenario where political leaders are allowed to alter the organizational structure, government-wide, without cost. In this scenario, leaders would be able to reduce complexity, and therefore reduce the likelihood of errors. One can refer to the organizational inefficiency lecture’s section on redundancy. Redundancy can lead to decreased individual commitment to a job (social shirking) while minimizing the costs of failure from the perspective of any one individual (compensation). Consider the overlapping investigations of the CIA and FBI in their tracking of terrorists: they operated in redundant capacities. Individuals were not motivated to find solutions to problems beyond their established SOPs, as the incentive to perform highly, and the incentive to avoid failure, is minimized within the SOP. Therefore, leaders can directly create an environment of reduced redundancy via the termination, separation, and amalgamation of organizations.
Another solution to ODM’s errors is a synthesis between the leadership styles necessary for either full organizational authority or a system without organizations. Where the most extreme version of ODM grants full authority to organizations, its opposite would require the executive and his advisors to dedicate their tenure to foreign policy decision-making. The synthesis of this extreme is a system where organizations operate with errors as they do now, but under the direction of a President who is clear in communicating goals and limitations to his senior officials and their staff. In the case of the failures leading up to 9/11, this would demand that the President respond to threats with orders to act on intelligence. Consider that when the CIA delivered their report to the President, indicating the likelihood of a terrorist attack, the President did not direct the CIA or other organizations to take countermeasures. Consider that when the NSC delivered its report to the FBI and other domestic organizations, it did not have orders from the President to direct domestic agencies to act on intelligence. Consider that the President has some authority in directing intelligence sharing between agencies, yet President Bush did not direct agencies to do so.
In short, Amy Zegart is correct – errors are a foundational component in organizational decision-making. SOPs, the need for explicit triggering from leadership, and the desire to run efficiently and retain resources all hinder the performance of organizations. ODM is content with producing SOPs independent of their effectiveness, and as such organizations are never prepared to act on novel situations. However, organizations are necessary in a complex environment, and leaders can avoid pitfalls by being active participants in the operations of various organizations.
Works Cited
Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed., Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999.
Simon, Herbert A. “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 79, no. 2, 1985, pp. 293–304. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1956650. Accessed 3 June 2024.
Strathman, Brent. “Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis.” POLS 142: Decision Making, Lecture 1, 4 April 2024, Girvetz Hall 2116, University of California Santa Barbara.
Strathman, Brent. “Introduction to the Organizational Model of Decision making.” POLS 142: Decision Making, Lecture 5, 18 April 2024, Girvetz Hall 2116, University of California Santa Barbara.
Strathman, Brent. “Introduction to the Psychology of Decision making.” POLS 142: Decision Making, Lecture 12, 14 May 2024, Girvetz Hall 2116, University of California Santa Barbara.
Strathman, Brent. “Introduction to the Psychology of Decision making.” POLS 142: Decision Making, Lecture 13, 16 May 2024, Girvetz Hall 2116, University of California Santa Barbara.
Strathman, Brent. “Introduction to the Rational Actor Model.” POLS 142: Decision Making, Lecture 2, 9 April 2024, Girvetz Hall 2116, University of California Santa Barbara.
Strathman, Brent. “The Inefficiencies of Organizational Decision Making.” POLS 142: Decision Making, Lecture 6, 23 April 2024, Girvetz Hall 2116, University of California Santa Barbara.
The Obama Administration and Imperialism in Libya
When the average American citizen hears “Libya”, they likely think of Muammar Gaddafi and his brutal end. Some contingent of Americans may recall the 2011 United States operation Odyssey Dawn and NATO’s operation Unified Protector, as well as the overwhelming airpower that aided rebels in deposing the Gaddafi regime. This paper will place these operations within a greater context of international and regional developments, it will analyze the operations themselves, and it will discuss the fallout of a post-Gaddafi Libya. The goal of this analysis is to establish a trajectory for the evolving justifications for war and to construct a pattern of behavior of the United States in foreign affairs.
A simple inquiry is insufficient to establish the levers of power or patterns of behavior for the United States generally, and the Obama administration specifically. However, these shallow observations do offer a point of departure for deeper analysis. The larger event within which the Libyan Civil War is located is the Arab Spring. This string of uprisings is popularly thought to have begun in late 2010 when a Tunisian fruit vendor self-immolated to protest government corruption. (Heffern 3) In the case of the 2011 Libyan uprising, some indices suggest a link between a low democracy score, a high youth unemployment rate, and abysmal press freedom as fuel for revolutionaries. (Robinson and Merrow) The term “Arab Spring” retains its place in 2011 within collective memory, and in this sense, it has proven its memetic strength – it has retained s its value as, “… the smallest unit of an idea that still has coherency.” (Lin) “Arab Spring” as a term which is tied to democratic reform can be traced back to 2005. At this time the term was making headway in what appears to be a minor discussion within the debate about the then ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. One State Department archive attempts to link mid-decade reforms to President Bush’s, “… new vision for peace and prosperity in the Middle East…” (The Middle East) One journalist preemptively dismisses the suggestion: “In fact, the Arabs’ move toward freedom is despite Bush, not because of him.” (Gould) Despite remarks to the contrary, the United States managed to score a media relations victory by linking its efforts and the Arab Spring to 2011, while minimizing the term’s association with the less popular Bush Presidency. The pattern established here: a manipulation of language and memes in pursuit of foreign policy strategy.
2005 was the staging ground for Gaddafi’s removal six years later, and the preparations surpassed the realm of media relations and manipulation. Four years prior, after the September 11th attacks on the Pentagon and on the World Trade Cetner, the international community supported the efforts of the United States to seek justice for its citizens. The United Nations Security Council called on the international community to root out terrorism, and expressed, “… strong support for the efforts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional administration leading to the formation of a government…” (Resolution) In the case of the invasion of Iraq,
“… when Washington tried to secure formal approval for war, the United States and its partners failed to gain their desired second U.N. resolution in early 2003. That is why, practically and legally, the war was not explicitly or unambiguously legal. It was in a grey area. But again, being in a grey area is not the same as being illegal.” (O’Hanlon)
In other words, the trust and goodwill of the international community had been depleted significantly in just over a year. Neither compassion nor fear could compel the competing great powers to stamp a seal of approval for the sole superpower’s imperial ambitions. Any subsequent military operations, especially those aimed against a Muslim-majority state, would likely fall outside of O’Hanlon’s legal gray zone: they would be illegal operations in the opinion of the United Nations Security Council and the international community in general.
However, the United States has proven time and again that it will not hesitate to twist and bend international rule of law to aid its conquest abroad. Be it forcing the resignation of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, pressuring the executive council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to fire Director-General Bustani, or efforts to undermine the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants, the United States has proven it has both the desire and ability to unilaterally shape international law. (Mamdani 205, 206, 208-209) Extending the metaphor of the international rule of law as a physical object, one should recognize that there is a limit to how much something can be twisted and bent before it breaks.
Ultimately the United States has an interest in maintaining the international rules-based order, even if only in name. The post-Cold War order, in which the United States remained the unchallenged superpower, is largely justified by a variety of benefits for the international community, some of which include the spread of liberal values and relative global stability. (Ackerman) Therefore, if the United States were to pursue aggressive regime change without any international support, it would risk destroying the international order, and in doing so undermine its own global leadership position. Replacing key positions in international leadership would not aid future military endeavors, and the UNSC operates with respect to both national interests and international norms. For the United States the only option was to modify the international norms themselves.
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, or R2P, established a norm for international forces to intervene in a sovereign nation in the name of humanitarian intervention. To be clear, the United Nations Security Council does have the legal authority to act against an aggressor state with actions ranging from, “… partial interruption of economic relations…”, to the use of, “… air, sea, or land forces…” (United Nations Charter). From a legal standpoint, this proves insufficient, as these Security Council powers had (until Odyssey Dawn in Libya) been used only to curtail interstate conflict.
Some may point to the infamous early-1990’s United States operation in Somalia as an example to the contrary to the legal restrictions imposed on the UNSC; Somalia was not recognized as operating with functioning government either in a de jure or de facto capacity, therefore there was no sovereign state with sovereign rights which could be violated. While the perspective is certainly controversial, its important to note that the United States was seriously considering placing Somalia under United Nations Trusteeship – a status reserved for states without legitimate governments. (Menkhaus and Ortmayer 12) However, the debacle in Somalia did prove to be one of many post-Cold War events which aided in the creation of the R2P doctrine. As early as 1992, the media class began to suggest that, “Moral imperatives… may soon take precedence over notions of sovereignty.” (Menkhaus and Ortmayer 5) While journalists may have had some impact on discourse surrounding international law, it was an interest group that led the lobbying for the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
The term “Interest Group” is applied with some liberty, as one article describes the group as, “… an epistemic community of experts, practitioners, and activists working on atrocity prevention and response.” (Williams and Bellamy 290) To the credit of this epistemic community, its more than likely that the vast majority of people who could be said to be in the community are operating under altruistic motives, but the fact remains that their actions did aid in the development of an ethics which violates sovereignty. Ultimately, the community holds that, “… foreign governments have a responsibility to stop mass atrocities…”, and that doing so with military means can be justified. (Williams and Bellamy 293) Presumably the term “epistemic community” inspires visions of philosophers debating ethics and nothing more, but this community’s ideals had a real-world impact on international relations.
In late autumn of 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Up until this point, any change in international norms had been confined to the realm of ethics, but the 2005 resolution is a key turning point in the international legal system, as it grants states the legal authority for intervention against a sovereign state that has not aggressed against another country. The resolution calls on the General Assembly to, “… continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide…”, and cites Chapters VI and Chapters VII as legal foundations for R2P. (Resolution adopted) Furthermore, United States diplomats working in the Obama administration during the air campaign against Libya had been vocal supporters of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine prior to the Arab Spring. (Williams and Bellamy 291) In short, in less than twenty years, the United States had run new stories undermining the sovereignty of African states, it had linked the War on Terror to the successes of the Arab Spring, and it had changed international ethics and laws to suit the drive for empire.
Obama entered office on the 20January 2009 – the worst of the “Great Recession” had passed (though it did persist), the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan raged on, and a year earlier the United States, and Libya signed an agreement compensating each other’s citizens. (Libya Profile) The agreement was a major steppingstone for U.S.-Libya relations. At the interpersonal level, the agreement provided compensation for victims of terrorist attacks attributed to Libya, as well as victims of bombing campaigns carried out by the United States. At the international level, the agreement was touted by the State Department as an avenue for renewing diplomatic relations. (US-LIBYA) To the State Department’s credit, the two countries had exchanged ambassadors by January 2009. (Libyan-U.S. Relations) Unfortunately for the people of Libya, the next interaction between the two states would be anything but diplomatic.
The Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia in 2010 – by early 2011 uprisings had spread across North Africa, with Libya’s rebellion challenging Gaddafi’s decades-long control of the country. President Obama claimed, “…that the United States could not stand in the way of the change sweeping the region also wanted to see that transformation evolve in an orderly way [sic].” (Heffern 11) Even if one takes this statement at face value, the dichotomy presented is wanting for specificity. The expectation that a series of democratic uprisings should, in authoritarian states, be orderly when the Tunisian President fled the country and the Egyptian President fled the capital, is an expectation violated the instant it was uttered. Order, in the sense that concerned President Obama, likely referred to something more akin to guiding the Arab Spring towards an endpoint that is conducive to American interests. Before exploring American interests in Libya (stated, implied, or highly probable based on history) one should familiarize themselves with the details of the decisions made in the days leading up to operation Odyssey Dawn and operation Unified Protector, as well as the operations themselves.
Presumably the reader thus far has been led to believe that this essay’s author is reflexively constructing an anti-American argument, where everything that the United States does is morally repugnant, and everything that its enemies do is virtuous – this is far from accurate. Often when studying international relations, one finds that competing states can jointly pursue disparate, morally bankrupt ends. In the case of Gaddafi, his regime was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of civilian protesters. (Heffern 4) Furthermore, Gaddafi issued genocidal threats against his people. Gaddafi referred to the Libyan rebels as cockroaches who would be cleansed from Libya, “… house by house.” (Libya Protests) Gaddafi demonstrated intent and ability to murder his own people. Both Gaddafi’s actions and the United States’ reaction can be seen as moral failures. Naturally this raises the question: how exactly did the United States respond?
Initially Obama and his administration in general were divided on the best course of action. The choice presented by senior officials in the administration was binary: do nothing or launch an attack against the Libyan regime. To the credit of the Obama administration, the attacks were not launched as reprisals for massacring civilians, nor were they an attempt to arrest Gaddafi: the attacks were intended to prevent Gaddafi from carrying out his “cleansing” of rebels in Benghazi. The timeline of events is what provided Obama and his advisors with the certainty that they had to act, if they were to act, and that they would have to do so quickly. Gaddafi had made his Hitlerian remarks on the 22nd of February, the rebels had established the National Transition Council in Benghazi on the 27th of February, and Gaddafi’s forces had begun their journey to Benghazi on the 14th of March. It was on March 15th that Obama and his advisors debated on how to proceed. (Heffern 13) On 19 March 2011 the United States launched operation Odyssey Dawn, in cooperation with coalition operations conducted by the French and the British. On the 31st of March, NATO agreed to launch operation Unified Protector. Command and control was transferred from the Unted States to NATO, where the bombing campaign in support of the National Transition Council continued until October 2011, when the Gaddafi regime was overthrown. (Heffern 4-5) In seven months the western alliance had managed to depose Gaddafi while only expending fuel, firepower, and man hours.
Depending on the scope of operational objectives considered, as well as the value placed on jus post bellum and the quality of life of for the Libyan people, one may arrive at different conclusions as to the success of the military operations. If the goals of the operations were to stop an impending crime against humanity, then the operations were a success considering that Gaddafi could have potentially razed Benghazi, killing nearly a million people in the process. Additionally, if the goal was to destroy Libyan air defenses, that was accomplished in 72 hours (Daalder and Stavridis 3) If the goal was to allow rebels to depose Gaddafi, that was accomplished in seven months. Regardless of the operational successes, the long-term outcome was the destruction of the Libyan state, along with any semblance of stability or safety for its people. Ambassador Heffern’s 2020 case study of Odyssey Dawn captures its failures best:
“In the end, the operation cannot be considered a long-term success for Libya for these reasons: Proliferation of Libyan weapons; Rise of extremist groups, militias; Refugees flooding into Europe; Local institutions were very weak, as Gaddafi had wanted; Some international presence, some military footprint could have helped with post-war operations. e.g., humanitarian relief; No programs for disarmament, demobilization or re-integration; No substantial effort to support the new government, to help get services off the ground.” (Heffern 31)
The Obama administration effectively reduced Libya to the status of Somalia in the early 1990’s. Media narratives, memetic persistence of the term “Arab Spring”, and manipulation of international ethics and law allowed the United States and NATO to do as they wished in Libya, yet beyond military operations on the ground, they failed.
One must ask if the intervention in Libya could have terminated without the destruction of the state and its institutions. The simplest description of the failure is that the western powers, led by the United States, failed to plan for a post-Gaddafi Libya. Ultimately this is more than slight oversight; Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned President Obama and senior officials that without a set termination point for the intervention, the war would be likely to go on indefinitely, which would be even more resource intensive without a post-Gaddafi plan. (Heffern 11) Gates was a senior among senior officials, having served under Geroge W. Bush as Secretary of Defense, as well as CIA Director under Bush Sr., yet President Obama and about half of his senior advisors ignored Gates’ warnings.
Presumably this indicates that officials in the Obama administration who advocated for intervention, despite Gates’ concerns, did so because they considered the likely costs of intervention less than the costs of doing nothing. These costs were mainly presented in humanitarian terms, where the, “… failure to stop the massacre of civilians would be moral stain on the U.S. and the international community [sic].” Furthermore, the officials in favor of intervention recall the atrocities committed in Rwanda and in the Balkans during the 1990’s. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice was one of these officials, who is also identified as one of the members of the “epistemic community of experts” by Williams and Bellamy in an earlier quotation. An additional fear for the interventionist camp was that a failure to intervene on the part of the United States would leaved France, the United Kingdom, and other regional powers to act on their own, which risked mor disastrous outcomes. (Heffern 11) The phrasing could just be a byproduct of Ambassador Heffern’s writing style, or it could be a result of mixed grammatical tenses, but in either case it suggests something sinister: there is an outcome worse than the chaos and destruction following the Libyan intervention. For the President of the United States and his top advisors, this worse outcome would likely be the undermining of American interests abroad.
The case for the destruction of Libya as an intentional act on the part of the Obama administration does face some challenges. There is the vague question surrounding the nature of American interests abroad. American troops and resources were already committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and Obama believed, “Libya was not a primary U.S. strategic interest…” (Heffern 13) The term “primary” is of primary interest, as it suggests that Libya did have some strategic value, but of a secondary or tertiary nature. This perception of Libya explains the level of American participation in the air campaign against Gaddafi’s government. Recall that United States operation Odyssey Dawn began on the 19th of March, and that NATO’s operation Unified Protector assumed command and control on 31st of March. This means that an air campaign that lasted about 200 days was led by the United States for only the first 12 days, where the remainder of the time NATO allies were responsible for 90% of airstrikes. (Heffern 26) A generous interpretation of these facts might lead one to conclude that the United States was simply overburdened by ongoing commitments abroad, and the proximity of Libya to Europe and Arab states could easily induce NATO allies and other regional powers to take charge where the United States could not spare resources. If one were to ask why United States and NATO operations were structured as they were, then this explanation would suffice. However, it fails to answer what the strategic interest Libya held for the United States. Some may propose that the United States was interested in promoting democracy abroad. That was, after all, the popular narrative behind the Arab Spring uprisings. This is unlikely considering that during the early years of the Obama administration, the President praised the American relationship with authoritarian Egypt, while cutting funding to pro-democratic programs in Egypt by more than a factor of four. (Gamal 258) Additionally, “In Bahrain… the United States launched a covert counter-revolution to crush the pro-democracy uprisings which erupted in February 2011.” (Gamal 267) Furthermore, if one accepts that democracy was the primary strategic concern for the United States, then one would have to question how a bombing campaign, without any humanitarian or nation-building services tied as a contingency, would aid in the creation of a democratic Libya post-Gaddafi.
Based on historical trends, one must conclude that the United States was worried that a democratic uprising in Libya would allow for yet another anti-western regime, like Iran, to take hold in the Muslim world. The fall of the American-backed regime in Iran led to the development of a one-sided relationship between the United States and Iran’s neighbor, Iraq. The history of the United States-Iraq relationship is that of a multi-decade series of abuse by a superpower (and then sole superpower) against, at best, a regional power. The phase of the relationship most relevant to comparison with Libya is the early phase of the 1980’s: “… the United States supported Iraq in the war against Iran, but it was also a setup, designed to keep the war going rather than bring it to a swift conclusion.” (Mamdani 180) American support was meant to bleed both sides of the war, which ultimately undermines the establishment of a regional power. In a similar sense, the United States considered a broken Libya preferable to either a state run by Gaddafi or by any competing faction in Libya. To be clear, Iraq is not the only historical example of this phenomenon. The United practiced similar tactics across various locations: in Nicaragua against the Sandinistas and in Afghanistan against the Soviets, the United States funded missions designed to fail in their overt objective, with the covert objective of bleeding the target, sacrificing countless people in the process (Mamdani 117, 124) Granted, this interpretation of events relies more so on a presumed continuation of past practices, and less so on supporting evidence. However, the development from Bush Senior’s 1992 operation Restore Hope to the 2005 United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is an evolution of past practices. The use of the term “Arab Spring” and its affiliation with demands for democracy is a continuation of public relations policy over a six-year period. The covert support for autocratic regimes while purporting to support democracy is a continuation of decades-old Cold War policy into the now recognized failure that was the War on Terror. In short, stated and implied policy goals fail to explain why the Obama administration destroyed Libya. That Libya was destroyed intentionally is the most likely explanation for the Obama administration’s reaction to the Arab Spring in Libya.
This essay did not touch on the volume of arms proliferation and on the nature of the atrocities committed in the absence of a stable government in Libya. Additionally, operation Inherent Resolve, which launched in 2015 during Obama’s tenure, was not discussed. These decisions were made in the interest of limiting the breadth and scope of this paper. In essence, the bombing campaign and the context which allowed for the bombing campaign to take place were the central events in the Libya-United States relationship. Commenting on post-war atrocities would make this paper more gruesome without advancing an argument. In the case of the 2015 operation, the target was the Islamic State, and while they were operating in Libya, the topic falls outside the scope of this paper.
In conclusion, the United States used its position as sole superpower to advance international ethics and laws that would ultimately serve its interests. It maintained a continued link between Cold War era claims of fighting for democracy, even when covertly working against democracy. It waged a relatively low-cost air campaign against Libya with the intent of destroying the government, despite the likely fallout as described by Secretary Gates. The United States-Libya relationship was effectively a microcosm of the United States-Iraq relationship, where bleeding the target was valued over democracy, order, or stability.
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The Nature of Biblical Law
Modern conceptions of law view the term to mean a statutory and authority dictate; in other words, laws are perceived as binding measures imposed by and through the state. Biblical Law, in contrast, was first introduced as a pedagogical framework for the ancient Israelites. Some scholars, while agreeing with the non-statutory and non-authoritative nature of Biblical Law at its inception, suggest that the law was not pedagogical, but descriptive. Only in later periods of development does Biblical Law come to embody the statutory and authoritative nature of law as understood by modern civilization.
Biblical Law’s less-than-authoritative and non-statutory nature was the norm up until the post-exilic period. Regarding the arguably pedagogical nature of the Torah in the pre-exilic period, one can refer to the traditional translation of the term “Torah” for guidance. The traditionally accepted translation for the term is “teaching”. Beyond simple etymological reasoning, one can refer to Wells’ What is Biblical Law. Wells’ essay makes the claim that the Pentateuch, i.e., the Torah, was less likely to be of legally binding character, and to instead be a means to embed and maintain religious ideology. An additional piece of evidence is the structure and wording of Biblical Law in the Torah. Specifically, in examination of the texts of Exodus and Deuteronomy, in their description of the decalogue, one finds that the ten commandments are commandments without sanctions. In other words, the document provides guidelines for behavior, without providing a punishment for less-than-ideal actions. This renders the Torah an effectively non-binding document at the time of its inception.
Academics offer a competing theory on the nature of Biblical Law in the pre-exilic period; Biblical Law as descriptive, as opposed to authoritative or pedagogical. Again, one can refer to Wells’ account in What is Biblical Law. Wells claims that Biblical Law may have served to record existing practices. The long list of hypothetical scenarios in the Torah is one indication of this possibility. For example, Exodus 21:37 provides a seemingly hypothetical scenario on the punishment for the theft and slaughter of an ox or sheep. These lists of hypotheticals are believed to have been recurring scenarios, with recurring remedies, which Biblical Law aimed to record.
The post-exilic nature of Biblical Law can be attributed to the work of Ezra and Nehemiah. These scribes are credited as the masterminds of the reconstruction of the temple, and of recording of the written Torah. One example of the authoritative nature of the Torah in the 2nd temple period can be found in Nehemiah 8:1-8. Here Ezra establishes the statutory nature of the Torah with the city elders at the city gate. This can be interpreted as a sort of proto-social contract.
This essay has demonstrated the likely pedagogical or descriptive nature of Biblical Law in the pre-exilic period, as well as the statutory and authoritative nature of Biblical Law in the post-exilic, or second temple period.
What is Torah?
Biblical Law is often equated with the Torah of Moses, or the Short Torah, as described in the Pentateuch. Biblical scholars, however, incorporate other teachings and frameworks via the concept of the Expansive Torah. This conception of the Torah as something beyond the first five books of the Bible manages to explain complimentary and competing material from extra-biblical works, like the Qumran Scrolls.
Complimentary materials between the Biblical Law and Qumran law are important in that they establish a common foundation for the collection of books. Without similar foundations, the claim that the Qumran Scrolls and Biblical Scrolls are part of the same religious tradition would be little more than speculation. The festival is one example of overlapping, or complimentary, materials. In both Leviticus 23, and Nehemiah 8, one finds descriptions of a festival in which booths are of central importance. Admittedly, Leviticus and Nehemiah differ somewhat in details, but the general description is similar enough. Furthermore, both Leviticus and Nehemiah rely on external authority to establish their law as law. Leviticus reminds the reader that The Lord freed the Israelites from Egypt; Nehemiah reminds the reader that the festival in question is dictate by the Torah.
While Qumran law shares a foundation with Biblical Law, it does deviate from some of the laws established by Biblical Law. Depending on one’s interpretation of the source material, it could be said that Biblical Law is the body of work deviates from Qumran Law. Regarding polygamy, Qumran law bans the practice based on appeals to the books of Genesis and Deuteronomy. The appeal made to Genesis relies on a premium placed on the order of creation. Scholars believe the Qumran community valued Genesis highly simply due to the ordinality of the Pentateuch, where Genesis is the first book. The Qumran community viewed Genesis as a collection of stories dictating the order (as opposed to chaos or disorder) of nature. When Genesis 7:9 refers to animal entering Noah’s ark two by two, this is interpreted as a dictate on the order of relationships for humans.
In contrast, Tannaitic interpretation (Rabbinic interpretation) is regarded as a more lenient form of the Torah. One need not analyze and compare Biblical Law and Qumran Law to reach this conclusion; Noam notes in Stringency in Qumran that the Qumran community itself notes the lenient nature of Pharisaic (Rabbinic) interpretations. In other words, the Qumran community simply carried on with the traditional view of the Torah, which was not open for interpretation, while the Pharisaic community relied on a new form of reasoning adopted from ancient Greece to interpret the Torah.
The Qumran community evolved from Biblical Law in that it reified existing stricter positions via appeal to multiple books of the Pentateuch. Other sects, in contrast, relied on Greek-derived philosophy and reasoning to update the Torah. In short, Expansive Torah was reasoning that reaffirmed existing practices by reference to the Torah. These reaffirmed positions were not found explicitly in the Torah, nor were they interpretations of the Torah, but instead logical reasonings derived from the Torah.
The Morally Problematic Nature of Terrorism
Just War Theory’s normative statements and subsequent logical conclusions on the outset of war, and waging of war, are largely constructed with the intent of limiting (if not outright prohibiting) state actors and their instruments of war. In its current form, Just War Theory fails to address the violent actions of terrorism, and the expected responses from state actors. The shortcomings of Just War Theory in the context of terrorism are what one may deem to be a morally problematic set of circumstances. This paper will examine the traditional approach to terrorism in Just War Theory as explained by Walzer’s 2006 article Terrorism and War. Then, Sussman’s 2013 article “Can Just War Theory Delegitimate Terrorism?”, will be used to critique, deconstruct, and reconstruct the traditional model. To be clear, the morally problematic position that will be explored is not one that aims to justify terrorism, but instead one that seeks to update the current construction of Just War Theory so that it may be better equipped to handle the moral dilemmas presented by terrorism.
Walzer seeks to reiterate the modern conception and condemnation of terrorism. In discussing terrorism, Walzer means, “… the random killing of innocent people, in the hope of creating pervasive fear.” (3). The key components of Walzer’s definition can be partitioned into three parts: random killing, innocent people, and pervasive fear. Most vague is the first term – random killing – in that the term would appear to simply specify a method of killing, when in fact it specifies both a method and an intent. Random murder is not random in that it haphazardly targets just any person, but it is random in that it deliberately targets a member of a group, with the intent that the group perceive a “universal vulnerability” about itself (6). The second term – innocent people – “describes the group of noncombatants, civilians, men and women who are not materially engaged in the war effort.” (3). The final term – pervasive fear – is to be understood in its common parlance, such that it is a widespread atmosphere of anxiety. It is a sense of universal vulnerability, restated. A deconstruction of Walzer’s definition may seem unnecessary, but the specificity of his terms creates a clear distinction between what does and does not qualify as terrorist activity, and by extension creates an additional category of non-state actors which are also not terrorist groups. Walzer creates this additional category deliberately, stating that in the case of the IRA, which attacked political leaders and gave civilians warning of attacks, “… ‘terrorism’ may not be the right word to use. It isn’t, after all, the only negative term in our moral vocabulary.” (6). The creation of a category that exists outside of terrorist organization and states is not a problem in and of itself, but it is a problem given that the existing Just War Theory paradigm does not address this category of potential and proven non-state actors. Walzer’s definition of terrorism only multiplies the problem via the creation of said category.
Implicit in the definition of terrorism is the presumption that the random killing of innocent people is morally condemnable, but Walzer explains why this is the case. Military units and civilians are grouped into two collectives which are defined by their purpose. The individuals of the military collective have, in practice, been stripped of their preferences and purposes and are, “… mobilized for a singular purpose, and what they do advances that purpose.” (4). The singular purpose of the military is military victory, whereas the purpose of the civilian collective is not military victory, but an amalgamation of individual preferences and purposes. Of course, a clear distinction between collectives is not sufficient to grant one collective immunity while allowing the other collective to incur fatalities, but the distinction is key to Walzer’s defense of civilian immunity. Another key component of Walzer’s argument is a prima facie rejection of the destruction of a people as a just cause for war. If it is unacceptable to wage a war with the intent of exterminating a people, then it is illegitimate to destroy a people as a practice in war, as one must wage a war with the intent of negotiating with a people at the end of the war (6).
There is the issue of hyperbole in this framing by Walzer: one does not expect a terrorist organization to have the resources to engage in actions so severe that an entire people’s existence would be realistically threatened. One could construct theoretical examples where a terrorist organization targets a people with a weak state, or a people within a weak state, and as such is realistically threatened by total extermination, but Walzer foregoes such speculative tasks in his defense of civilian immunity. It is not just that terrorism targets the innocent, and threatens mass extermination, but that terrorism is responsible for, “… a devalued collective, a group of men and women who have been deprived of the right to life or, alternatively, of the right to live where they are living. They have been denied… Freedom from fear.” (7). While Walzer may rely on appeals to jus ad bellum conceptions of just war to condemn potentially genocidal terrorist groups, he manages to condemn even the smallest and least relevant terrorist organizations by condemning their use of pervasive fear. To be clear, the pervasive nature of this fear is not only widespread in that it reaches all members of a people, but is also widespread in time and place, suggesting that a member of the civilian collective is vulnerable to attack anywhere and anytime. As commendable as it may be to defend the rights of civilians, this logic leads one to conclude that wars, just or otherwise, should not be fought. All wars pose some risk to civilians on both sides, and as such these risks can be said to create a pervasive atmosphere of fear.
Using Walzer’s argument as a proxy for traditional Just War Theory in general, some statements can be made about Just War Theory’s shortcomings as examined in this paper thus far: Just War Theory’s definition of terrorism proliferates subcategories of international actors for which Just War Theory does not account, and it condemns widespread fear in a manner which effectively makes all wars illegitimate. While the point made thus far is that Just War Theory delegitimizes not just terrorism but all wars, Sussman critiques JWT from the other extreme, claiming that it fails to delegitimize terrorism.
Sussman claims that the foundational pillars of Just War Theory are three dichotomies, one of which is, “… the distinction between states and their armies and nonstates and their various military associations or other agents …” (426). While this dichotomy may seem to be purely descriptive, the practical applications are such that state actors (and by extension state violence) are privileged over the status of, and violence perpetrated by, non-state actors. Sussman instead proposes a competing dichotomy which judges political violence according to its necessity. Simply put, violence which is unavoidable is justified, whereas violence which is avoidable is not justified. This new dichotomy is key to Sussman’s, “agent-neutral theory”, i.e., “… a theory of just political violence.” (426). The agent-neutral theory manages to maintain key concepts of Just War Theory while remedying Walzer’s proliferation of unconsidered categories. For example, Walzer’s definition of terrorism remains viable in the new dichotomy, insofar as it bars terrorist activities from any state, non-state actor, and individual. Furthermore, the focus on the avoidable or unavoidable nature of violence maintains self-defense as a just cause for war, as well as maintaining that wars only be fought as a last resort. Agent-neutral theory goes beyond standardizing restrictions on violence for all actors, and potentially grants validity to claims made by this same varied basket of actors. Where, “… Just War Theory does not allow non-state agents any real access to its conceptual resources …” (433), it allows any actor to engage in violence if the violence is legitimately an unavoidable last resort.
What remains to be remedied is the logical endpoint of Walzer’s definition of terrorism, which leads to the prohibition of all war; a theory of just political violence remedies this logical endpoint. First, one must discard Walzer’s definition of terrorism. As mentioned earlier, any war can create an atmosphere of fear, and a restriction that bars such an atmosphere is ultimately unrealistic. What has already been proven is that the new theory maintains some level of restrictions on violence. What remains to be proven is if the agent-neutral theory provides sufficient safeguards for civilians.
Sussman’s analysis on this point deconstructs the Just War Theory dichotomy of combatants and non-combatants. Modern day governments, especially in the case of democracies, blur the line between soldier and civilian. Liberal democracy claims that, “… the people have become the literal sovereign…”, where, “… Citizens’ taxes fund those wars…”, and that, “almost all recent instances of violent political conflict have been profoundly influenced by public opinion …” (434). In practice, traditional soldier-civilian dichotomy does not exist. This does not indicate that all people, from both collectives, should be treated as liable targets, but it does indicate that a clear split between the two collectives does not exist. Instead, one should conceptualize a soldier-civilian spectrum, where someone holding knife to someone’s throat is on one extreme, and a newborn infant is on the other. Relevant to the requirement of last resort in agent-neutral theory, one would be justified in their violence against another depending on the position of the target on the spectrum. For example, if one were to attack the man holding a knife to someone’s throat, and the victim and their people face genocide, then one would be justified in continuing attacking individuals in the soldier-civilian spectrum until one and their people are no longer threatened.
Just War Theory is incomplete. The state-centric view does not adequately restrict terroristic violence, nor does it allow for non-state actors to address grievances. It creates multiple unregulated categories while restricting even the most just of wars. More importantly, the construction of an alternative theory demonstrates that the moral problems with terrorism can be addressed. However, this analysis must conclude that Just War Theory’s assessment that terrorism is morally problematic is valid.
Works Cited
Sussmann, N. (2013). Can just war theory delegitimate terrorism? European Journal of Political Theory, 12(4), 425-446. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885112464478.
Walzer, M. Terrorism and Just War. Philosophia 34, 3–12 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-006-9004-1
Great Power Power Politics During the Inter-Trump Era
The international system faces a chaotic era of transition, where the once dominant Russian sphere of influence declines, while the People’s Republic of China grows economically and militarily. Russia aggresses against its neighbors in efforts to maintain its security, while China threatens – and has the power – to reshape the international order. This paper will discuss the options available to the United States for containing the fallout of a declining Russia while preventing a Chinese takeover of the international system. This paper will focus primarily on economic options available to the United States. These options take the form of a trade war with China and sanctions on Russia. The discussion will focus on both the system-level and bureaucracy-level factors which necessitate the use of options presented.
Central to the argument in favor of economic options is the historically proven trend, where a country’s economic success precedes its military power. In the case of the United States, “Fearful Europeans warned of an ‘American invasion’ (an overwhelming offensive of U.S.-made goods and multinationals), long before they worried about the challenge of U.S. military, political, or cultural power.” (LaFeber 21) The era referenced in the quote above refers to the late 19th century, and now, over a century later, the United States is the preeminent military power in the international system. In drawing a causal line from economy to military, it can be deduced that economic means are a viable avenue for weakening adversaries in the international system.
In the case of China, a trade war has been waged by the Trump and Biden administrations. Costs and benefits associated with this tactic can be examined to determine what changes, if any, should be implemented. The costs of the trade war are distributed among both the working class and the business owners in the United States. As far as job losses are concerned, “…some 245,000 American jobs were lost because the tariffs increased the costs of imported materials and components…” (Huang 243) As for the businesses themselves, totals on lost revenue remain vague, but the risk is clear: “America’s vulnerability takes the more diffuse form of $600 billion in annual revenues that American companies earn operating within China’s borders.” (Huang 246) Costs and risks exist, but these figures lack perspective. For example, the job losses reported by Huang only account for 0.152% of the employed civilian labor force of the United States as reported for October 2023. Taken all at once, if the unemployment figures for October 2023 are used as a baseline, these job losses would increase the unemployment rate from 3.9% to 4.0% (BLS 4). These job figures pale in comparison to the on average 278,000 jobs added – per month – during the first half of 2023 (Stone 4). Total risk to American firms is more substantial; with an American GDP of 25.46 trillion, annual revenues of $600 billion account for 2% of GDP (GDP (Current US$) – United States). While current and likely future legislation may not risk a complete shutdown of American firms, this percentage can be examined as a worst-case scenario. A 2% drop in GDP is cause for concern given that, “a recession is usually associated with a decline of 2 percent in GDP,” but this percentage of GDP contraction is relatively minor when one considers that, “In the case of severe recessions, the typical output cost is close to 5 percent.” (Claessens) Costs should be considered for workers and businesses, but they should be examined in context as well.
The benefits of a trade war with China can be similarly scrutinized. One PIIE report places the beginning of the Trump-China trade war in 2018 (Bown). Chinese unemployment numbers from July 2018 to August 2019 may seem dramatic. “… Chinese securities firm, China International Capital Corporation Limited (CICC)… estimates that combined employment in mining, manufacturing, utilities, and construction, an aggregate the firm refers to as broad manufacturing, “has fallen by 5 million…” (Lardy) That same article notes that total non-farm employment in China is around 570 million. The 5 million jobs lost in the period in question represent a decrease of less than 0.9% in total non-farm employment. Some may doubt statistics released by Chinese firms, but the World Bank corroborates CICC’s claim; Chinese unemployment increased from 4.3% to 4.6% from 2018 to 2019 (Unemployment). This rate of rising unemployment is 4 times slower than the increase seen in the United States in summer/fall of 2023 (BLS 4).
As was the case with the United States, the total risk to the Chinese economy should be investigated. In 2022, imports to the United States from China totaled $562.9 billion (The People’s Republic of China). Again, while current and likely future legislation may not risk a complete shutdown of trade between the United States and China, this number will be examined as a worst-case scenario. With a GDP of 17.96 trillion (GDP (Current US$) – China.), total risk to the Chinese economy amounts to 3.1% of GDP. This percentage of GDP loss places China squarely in the range for a recession as defined by Claessens, and a more severe recession than what would be hypothetically expected by the United States, yet the loss remains minor.
Presented data provides a basis for continued economic warfare, but for some the benefits may be minor to justify the loss of American jobs and revenue. One should remember that the economic means employed against China are meant to restrict its ability to threaten the international order, which can be curbed by reducing China’s military potential. Some trade restrictions draw this casual line more explicitly. In October of 2022, the United States Department of Commerce announced the implementation of export controls that ban exports of, “Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items…” to China. These items have direct military applications; they, “… are used by the PRC to produce advanced military systems including weapons of mass destruction; improve the speed and accuracy of its military decision making, planning, and logistics, as well as of its autonomous military systems…” (United States) To be clear, China is not completely dependent on the United States for semiconductor acquisition, but China’s options do fall behind the cutting edge semiconductor technology available to the United States. For example, beyond Taiwan based semiconductor manufacturer TSMC, “the only firm capable of commercially producing today’s most advanced 5-nanometer (nm) chips is South Korea’s Samsung Electronics.” (Campbell) Taiwan and South Korea are both close American allies, and as such are unlikely to sell their more advanced semiconductors to China. To summarize the impact of the U.S.-China Trade war, China has more to lose from prolonged protectionism, both in economic terms and in direct military applications.
Following a similar logic regarding Russia, one can investigate the effects of sanctions on its economy during its ongoing invasion. While more extreme, the sanctions are similar to the trade war with China in that they target both the Russian economy – which limits Russia’s ability to expand its military power – while also targeting military capacity directly. Recent sanctions were placed on Russia as a response to the more aggressive invasion of Ukraine, which began in 2022. Core to the Russian economy are its energy exports, which account for 45% of the Russian Federation’s budget in 2021 (IEA). As a result, a core American response to the Russian invasion has been sanctions on Russian energy imports (Fact Sheet). Costs to American consumers have been minimal. While the average consumer may look back on recent months and recall increases in gas prices, the year following a ban on Russian oil imports was very different. From March 2022 to March 2023, energy prices overall dropped by over six percent (Energy). Additionally, United States GDP increased by 1.94% in 2022 (GDP and Spending), indicating that the sanctions on Russia are having a minimal effect, if any, on the American economy.
The effects on Russia are more severe. Thus far, energy sanctions have impacted Russian export revenues dramatically. Oil-export earnings compared between February 2022 and February 2023 dropped 41.7 % (Impact). Furthermore, trade sanctions have negatively influenced Russian GDP. With data obtained from the OECD, the same Consilium article shows a contraction of 2.5% in Russian GDP in 2022; it predicts the same result for 2023. Recall the Claassens article referenced in the section about theoretical losses to American and Chinese GDP: a contraction in GDP of this magnitude indicates a recession. In the case of Russia, this is anything but theoretical.
Like China, Russia faces export and import controls. The future of the Russian energy sector will soon be hindered by additional license requirements, if not outright denial of exports, for key components of the oil-refining process (The Impact).Semiconductor export bans extend to the Russian Federation as well, resulting in the stripping of parts from existing aircraft, a slowdown in the production of next-generation aircraft, and a cessation in the production of hypersonic ballistic missiles (The Impact). Again, sanctions have direct military consequences for the intended target.
Ultimately, economic warfare is having an outsized negative effect on China and Russia relative to the United States. The economic avenues pursued thus far have proven effective, and the data suggests that existing policies effectively weaken competitors in the international system. A question that remains to be answered: why wage economic warfare at all? Optimists may be inclined to believe in the eventual implosion of Russia and China, and as such are likely to see warfare of any kind and scale unnecessary and not worth the costs to the American economy. Unfortunately, system level dynamics require ongoing economic warfare. An observation and core tenant of realism is the anarchic state of the international system; a state of existence correlated with recurring violence (Waltz 2). Detractors may point to the trend in declining deaths from war and cite this as evidence to the contrary of Waltz’s view of international anarchy, but his take on realism entails factors beyond brute force.
If system dynamics do not appear to necessitate violence, threats to the system remain from the potential challengers as expressed in balance of power theory. The most generous interpretation of the current international balance of power, from the view of detractors, is one where the United States is the sole unipolar power. For a unipolar balance, i.e. an unbalanced system, Waltz states, “that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another.” (Waltz 23) The inevitable rise of a competing power requires that the United States weaken the most likely competitors to so that it may maintain a dominant position, even if only a by a marginal degree. In the pursuit of international well-being – a world without war, even of the economic variety – detractors may suggest that the United States and China should cooperate and forego competition. Waltz would argue against this arrangement: “… balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system.” (Waltz 22) The United States is the dominant global power, and as such is unlikely to seduce other powers into truly cooperative partnerships. Russia, just like China and the United States, is an actor within the international system, and therefore all system dynamics discussed in this section apply to Russia as well. System dynamics necessitate competition between China and the United States.
Admittedly, the proposed policy positions presented in the preceding pages are distinctly conservative (in attitude, as opposed to traditional interpretations of “conservative” within the political realm) and promote nothing beyond continuing with existing import/export controls and sanctions. There is some room for adjustment of existing policies, but there are organizational, i.e. bureaucratic, factors which constrain the extremities of adjustment. One set of factors are the risks, or the expected costs and benefits of implementing a policy. Policies like the trade war with China and the sanctions on Russia have proven their value in extracting benefits that outweigh their implementation costs. These policies are maintained via established programs, and the, “Assured capability for reliable performance of action… depends upon the behavior of hundreds of persons requires established ‘programs.’” (Allsion 11) From this it can be inferred that new programs, which are not yet established, run risks that offer something less than assured capability. Furthermore, established programs are likely to stay in place, operating beyond the point where costs outweigh benefits (Allison 16). Relevant to this reality is the discussion concerning theoretical losses to American and Chinse GDP: benefits appear to outweigh costs, even if existing policies are carried out their extreme. Allison’s analysis, paired with data compiled in previous pages, suggests that the bounds of effective policy are up to and including a sanctions regime that is as restrictive with China as it is with Russia as of December 2023.
To combat the People’s Republic of China, and to constrain the Russian Federation, the United States should seek a gradual escalation of the trade war with China and continued pressure on Russia through sanctions. Waltz shows that the United States has no choice but to compete with potential rivals in the international system. Allsion shows that the United States would be most effective if working within the constrains of existing policy. The data shows that policy should be more aggressive, where both China and Russia are as isolated as possible from the American economy.
Works Cited
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Carlos Cruz: Writing Samples 